CHARLES G. FINNEY
I. Definition of Law.
II. Distinction between Physical and Moral Law.
III. Attributes of Moral Law.
I. In discussing the subject, I must begin with defining the term Law.
Law, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for my purpose, is A Rule of Action. In its generic signification, it is applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of mind--whether intelligent or unintelligent--whether free or necessary action.
II. I must distinguish between Physical and Moral Law.
Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or mind. I mean all changes, whether of state or action, that do not consist in the voluntary states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of force, or necessity, as opposed to the law of liberty. Physical law is the law of the material universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its states and changes are involuntary. All changes of mental state or action, which do not consist in free and sovereign changes or actions of will, must occur under, and be subject to Physical Law. They can not possibly be accounted for, except as they are ascribed to the law of necessity or force. In one word, then, Physical Law is the law of necessity or force, and controls all changes and actions, whether of matter or mind, except the actions of free will.
Moral Law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule of action to which moral beings are under a moral obligation to conform all their voluntary actions, and is enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to necessary and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity--of motive and free choice, as opposed to force of every kind that renders action necessary, or unavoidable. Moral Law is a rule for the direction of the action of free will, and strictly of free will only. But less strictly, it is the rule for the direction of the actions of free will, and of all those actions and states of mind and body, that are connected with the free actions of will by a Physical Law, or by a law of necessity. Thus, Moral Law controls involuntary mental states and outward action, only by securing conformity of the actions of free will to its precept.
III. I must point out the essential attributes of Moral Law.
1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, an idea of the Reason, developed in the mind of the subject. It is an idea, or conception of that state of will, or course of action which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No one can be a moral agent, or the subject of Moral Law, unless he has this idea developed; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law developed, or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes "a law to himself," his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, or law.
2. A second attribute is Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. Its precept must lie developed in the Reason, as a rule of duty--a law of moral obligation--a rule of choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that which a moral agent ought to choose, will, intend. But it does not, must not, can not possess the attribute of necessity in its relations to the actions of free will. It must not, can not, possess an element or attribute of force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept unavoidable and necessary. This would confound it with Physical Law.
3. A third attribute of Moral Law, is adaptability, or adaptation. It must be the Law of Nature, that is, its precept must prescribe and require just that state of the will, and that course of action which is demanded by the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing more or less.
Moral Law, subjectively considered, is simply an idea of that state of the voluntary power, that is befitting to moral agents upon condition of their nature and relations. Their nature and relations being perceived, the reason hereupon necessarily affirms that they ought to will, intend, the highest good of being for its own intrinsic value. This is what is meant by the law of nature. It is a law, or rule, necessarily imposed upon us by our own nature. It is nothing more or less than that which reason spontaneously and necessarily affirms to be fit, proper, right, in view of our nature and relations, and the intrinsic value of the highest well being of God and the universe. Those being given, this is affirmed to be duty. It is an idea of that state of the heart, and that course of life, that from their nature and relations, is indispensable to the highest good of all. By Moral Law being the Law of Nature, is intended, that the nature and relations of moral agents being what they are, a certain course of willing and acting is indispensable to, and will result in their highest well being; that their highest well being is valuable in itself, and should be willed for that reason.
4. A fourth attribute of Moral Law is Universality. The conditions being the same, it requires, and must require, of all moral agents, the same things, in whatever world they may be found.
5. A fifth attribute of Moral Law, is Uniformity. All the conditions and circumstances being the same, its claims are uniformly the same. This follows from the very nature of Moral Law.
6. A sixth attribute of Moral Law is, and must be, Impartiality. Moral Law is no respecter of persons--knows no privileged classes. It demands one thing of all, without regard to anything, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it is not intended, that the same course of outward conduct is required of all--but the same state of heart in all--that all shall have one ultimate intention--that all shall consecrate themselves to one end--that all shall entirely conform in heart and life to their nature and relations.
7. A seventh attribute of Moral Law is, and must be, Justice. That which is unjust can not be Law.
Justice, as an attribute of Moral Law, must respect both the precept and the sanction. Justice, as an attribute of the precept, consists in the requisition of just that, and no more, which is in exact accordance with the nature and relations of the subject.
Justice, as an attribute of the sanction, consists in the promise of just such rewards and punishments as are equal to the guilt of disobedience, on the one hand, and to the value of obedience on the other.
Sanctions belong to the very essence and nature of Moral Law. A law without sanctions is no law; it is only counsel, or advice. Sanctions are--in a certain sense, to be explained in a future lecture--the motives which the Law presents, with design to secure obedience to the precept. Consequently, they should always be graduated by the importance of the precept; and that is not properly law which does not promise, expressly or impliedly, a reward proportionate to the value of obedience, and threaten punishment equal to the evil or guilt of disobedience. Law can not be unjust, either in precept or sanction: and it should always be remembered, that what is unjust, is not law, can not be law. It is contrary to the true definition of law. Moral Law is a rule of action, founded in, and suited to, the nature and relations of moral beings, sustained by sanctions equal to the value of obedience, and the guilt of disobedience.
8. An eighth attribute of Moral Law is Practicability. That which the precept demands, must be possible to the subject.. That which demands a natural impossibility, is not, and can not be Moral Law. The true definition of law excludes the supposition that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute impossibility. Such a demand could not be in accordance with the nature and relations of moral agents, and therefore practicability must always be an attribute of Moral Law. To talk of inability to obey Moral Law, is to talk sheer nonsense.
9. A ninth attribute of Moral Law is Independence. It is founded in the self-existent nature of God. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the Divine Reason. It is the unalterable and eternal self-existent rule of the Divine conduct, the law which the intelligence of God imposes on Himself. He is a law to Himself. Moral Law, as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and can not originate in the will of God. It originates, or rather, is founded in his eternal, immutable, self-existent nature. It eternally existed in the Divine Reason. It is the idea of that state of will which is obligatory upon God upon condition of his natural attributes, or in other words, upon condition of his nature. As a law, it is entirely independent of his will, just as his own existence is. It is obligatory also upon every moral agent, entirely independent of the will of God. Their nature and relations being given, and their intelligence being developed, Moral Law must be obligatory upon them, and it lies not in the option of any being to make it otherwise. To pursue a course of conduct suited to their nature and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, the willing or nilling of any being to the contrary notwithstanding.
10. A tenth attribute of moral law is Immutability. Moral Law can never change, or be changed. Moral Law always requires of every moral agent a state of heart and course of conduct precisely suited to his nature and relations. Nothing more nor less. Whatever his nature is, his capacity and relations are, entire conformity to just that nature, those capacities and relations, is required at every moment, and nothing more or less. If capacity is enlarged, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of works of supererogation--of doing more than the Law demands; for the Law still, as always, requires the full consecration of his whole being to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability is abridged, Moral Law, always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires that what is left--nothing more or less--shall be consecrated to the same end as before. Whatever demands more or less than entire, universal, and constant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacity and relations of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and can not be, Moral Law. To suppose that it could be otherwise, would be to contradict the true definition of Moral Law. If therefore, the capacity is by any means abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of rendering full obedience; for the Law still demands and urges, that the heart and life shall be fully conformed to the present existing nature, capacity, and relations. Anything that requires more or less than this, whatever else it is, is not, and can not be Moral Law. To affirm that it can, is to talk nonsense. Nay, it is to blaspheme against the immaculate majesty of Moral Law. Moral Law invariably holds one language. It never changes the spirit of its requirement. "Thou shalt love," or be perfectly benevolent, is its uniform, and its only demand. This demand it never varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and for the same reason. To talk of letting down, or altering Moral Law, is to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being has the right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very nature of Moral Law. Should the natural capability of the mind, by any means whatever, be enlarged or abridged, it is perfectly absurd and a contradiction of the nature of Moral Law, to say, that the claims of the law are either elevated or lowered. Moral Law is not a statute, an enactment, that has its origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It is the Law of Nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself. It is the unalterable demand of the Reason, that the whole being, whatever there is of it at any time, shall be entirely consecrated to the highest good of universal being. In other words, it is the soul's idea or conception of that state of heart and course of life, which is exactly suited to its nature and relations. It can not be too distinctly understood, that Moral Law is nothing more or less, than the Law of Nature, that is, it is the rule imposed on us, not by the arbitrary will of any being, but by our own intelligence. It is an idea of that which is fit, suitable, agreeable to our nature and relations for the time being, that which it is reasonable for us to will and do, at any and every moment, in view of all the circumstances of our present existence,--just what the Reason affirms to be suited to our nature and relations, under all the circumstances of the case.
It has been said, that if we dwarf, or abridge our powers, we do not thereby abridge the claims of God; that if we render it impossible to perform so high a service as we might have done, the Lawgiver, nevertheless, requires the same as before, that is, that under such circumstances He requires of us an impossibility;--that should we dwarf, or completely derange, or stultify our powers, He would still hold us under obligation to perform all that we might have performed, had our powers remained in their integrity. To this I reply,
That this affirmation assumes, that Moral Law and moral obligation, are founded in the will of God;--that His mere will makes law. This is a fundamental mistake. God can not legislate in the sense of making Law. He declares and enforces the common law of the universe, or, in other words, the Law of Nature. This law, I repeat it, is nothing else than that rule of conduct which is in accordance with the nature and relations of moral beings. The totality of its requisitions are, both in its letter and its spirit, "thou shalt love, etc., with all thy heart, thy soul, thy might, thy strength." That is, whatever there is of us, at any moment, is to be wholly consecrated to God, and the good of being, and nothing more or less. If our nature or relations are changed, no matter by what means, or to what extent, provided we are still moral agents, its language and spirit are the same as before,--"Thou shalt love with all thy strength," etc.
I will here quote from the Oberlin Evangelist, an extract of a letter from an esteemed brother, embodying the substance of the above objection, together with my reply.
"One point is what you say of the claims of the law, in the Oberlin Evangelist, Vol. 2, p. 50:--'The question is, What does the law of God require of Christians of the present generation, in all respects in our circumstances, with all the ignorance and debility of body and mind which have resulted from the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution through so many generations?' But if this be so, then the more ignorant and debilitated a person is in body and mind, in consequence of his own or ancestors' sins and follies, the less the law would require of him, and the less would it be for him to become perfectly holy--and, the nearer this ignorance and debility came to being perfect, the nearer would he be to being perfectly holy, for the less would be required of him to make him so. But is this so? Can a person be perfectly sanctified while particularly that 'ignorance of mind,' which is the effect of the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution, remains? Yea, can he be sanctified at all, only as this ignorance is removed by the truth and Spirit of God; it being a moral and not a physical effect of sinning? I say it kindly; here appears to me at least, a very serious entering wedge of error. Were the effect of human depravity upon man simply to disable him, like taking from the body a limb, or destroying in part, or in whole, a faculty of the mind, I would not object; but to say, this effect is ignorance, a moral effect wholly, and then say, having this ignorance, the Law levels its claims according to it, and that with it, a man can be entirely sanctified, looks not to me like the teachings of the Bible."
(1.) I have seen the passage from my lecture here alluded to, quoted and commented upon, in different periodicals, and uniformly with entire disapprobation.
(2.) It has always been separated entirely from the exposition which I have given of the Law of God in the same lectures; with which exposition, no one, so far as I know, has seen fit to grapple.
(3.) I believe, in every instance, the objections that have been made to this paragraph, were made by those who profess to believe in the present natural ability of sinners to do all their duty.
(4.) I would most earnestly and respectfully inquire, what consistency there is, in denominating this paragraph a dangerous heresy, and still maintaining that men are at present naturally able to do all that God requires of them?
(5.) I put the inquiry back to those brethren,--by what authority do you affirm, that God requires any more of any moral agent in the universe, and of man in his present condition, than he is at present able to perform?
(6.) I inquire, does not the very language of the law of God prove to a demonstration, that God requires no more of man than, in his present state, he is able to perform? Let us hear its language: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Now here, God so completely levels his claims, by the very wording of these commandments, to the present capacity of every human being, however young or old, however maimed, debilitated, or idiotic, as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof. Hickok, of Auburn Seminary, uttered in my hearing that, "if it were possible to conceive of a moral pigmy, the Law requires of him nothing more, than to use whatever strength he has, in the service and for the glory of God."
(7.) I most respectfully but earnestly inquire of my brethren, if they believe that God requires as much of men as of angels, or a child as a man, of a half-idiot as of a Newton? I mean not to ask whether God requires an equally perfect consecration of all the powers actually possessed by each of these classes; but whether in degree, He really requires the same, irrespective of their present natural ability?
(8.) I wish to inquire, whether my brethren do not admit that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that every abuse of the physical system has abridged the capacity of the mind, while it remains connected with this tenement of clay? And I would also ask, whether my brethren mean to maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of present natural ability to comply with all the requirements of God, and also the fact that God now requires of man just the same degree of service that he might have rendered if he had never sinned, or in any way violated the laws of his being? And if they maintain these two positions at the same time, I farther inquire, whether they believe that man has natural ability at the present moment to bring all his faculties and powers, together with his knowledge, on to as high ground and into the same state in which they might have been, had he never sinned? My brethren, is there not some inconsistency here?
(9.) In the paragraph from the letter above quoted, the brother admits, that if a man by his own act had deprived himself of any of his corporeal faculties, he would not thenceforth be under an obligation to use those faculties. But he thinks this principle does not hold true, in respect to the ignorance of man; because he esteems his ignorance a moral, and not a natural defect. Here I beg leave to make a few inquiries:
[1.] Should a man wickedly deprive himself of the use of a hand, would not this act be a moral act? No doubt it would.
[2.] Suppose a man by his own act, should make himself an idiot, would not this act be a moral act?
[3.] Would he not in both these cases render himself naturally unable, in the one case, to use his hand, and in the other, his reason? Undoubtedly he would. But how can it be affirmed, with any show of reason, that in the one case his natural inability discharges him from the obligation to use his hand, and that in the other case, his natural ability does not affect his obligation--that he is still bound to use his reason, of which he has voluntarily deprived himself, but not his hand? Now the fact is, that in both these cases the inability is a natural one.
[4.] I ask, if a man has willingly remained in ignorance of God, whether his ignorance is a moral or natural inability? If it is a moral inability, he can instantly overcome it, by the right exercise of his own will. And nothing can be a moral inability that can not be instantaneously removed by our own volition. Do my brethren believe, that the present ignorance of mankind can be instantaneously removed, and their knowledge become as perfect as it might have been had they never sinned, by an act of volition on the part of men? If they do not, why do they call this a moral inability, or ignorance a moral effect? The fact is, that ignorance is often the natural effect of moral delinquency. Neglect of duty occasions ignorance; and this ignorance constitutes a natural inability to do that of which a man is utterly ignorant--just as the loss of a hand, in the case supposed, is the natural effect of a moral act, but in itself constitutes a natural inability to perform those duties that might have been performed but for the loss of this hand. The truth is, that this ignorance does constitute, while it remains, a natural inability to perform those duties of which the mind is ignorant; and all that can be required is, that from the present moment, the mind should be diligently and perfectly engaged in acquiring what knowledge it can, and in perfectly obeying, as fast as it can obtain the light. If this is not true, it is utter nonsense to talk about natural ability as being a sine qua non of moral obligation. And I would kindly, but most earnestly ask my brethren, by what rule of consistency they maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of a natural ability to do whatever God requires, and also insist that He requires men to know as much, and in all respects to render Him the same kind and degree of service as if they never had sinned, or rendered themselves in any respect naturally incapable of doing and being, at the present moment, all that they might have done and been, had they never in any instance neglected their duty?
(10.) The brother, in the above paragraph, seems to feel pressed with the consideration, that if it be true that a man's ignorance can be any excuse for his not at present doing what he might have done but for this ignorance, it will follow, that the less he knows the less is required of him, and should he become a perfect idiot, he would be entirely discharged from moral obligation. To this I answer: Yes, or the doctrine of natural ability, and the entire Government of God, are a mere farce. If a man should annihilate himself, would he not thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God? Yes, truly. Should he make himself an idiot, has he not thereby annihilated his moral agency; and of course his natural ability to obey God? And will my New School brethren adopt the position of Dr. Wilson of Cincinnati, as maintained on the trial of Dr. Beecher, that "moral obligation does not imply ability of any kind?" The truth is, that for the time being, a man may destroy his moral agency, by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot; and while this lunacy or idiocy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required.
But it is also true, that no human being and no moral agent can deprive himself of reason and moral agency, but for a limited time. There is no reason to believe, that the soul can be deranged or idiotic, when separated from the body. And therefore moral agency will in all cases be renewed in a future, if not in the present state of existence, when God will hold men fully responsible for having deprived themselves of power to render Him all that service which they might otherwise have rendered. But do let me inquire again, can my dear brethren maintain that an idiot or lunatic can be a moral agent? Can they maintain, that a moral being is the subject of moral obligation any farther than he is in a state of sanity? Can they maintain, that an infant is the subject of moral obligation, previous to all knowledge? And can they maintain, that moral obligation can, in any case, exceed knowledge? If they can and do--then, to be consistent, they must flatly deny that natural ability is a sine qua non of moral obligation, and adopt the absurd dogma of Dr. Wilson, that 'moral obligation does not imply any ability whatever.' When my brethren will take this ground, I shall then understand and know where to meet them. But I beseech you, brethren, not to complain of inconsistency in me, nor accuse me of teaching dangerous heresy, while I teach nothing more than you must admit to be true, or unequivocally admit, in extenso, the very dogma of Dr. Wilson, quoted above.
I wish to be distinctly understood. I maintain, that present ignorance is present natural inability, as absolutely as the present want of a hand is present natural inability to use it. And I also maintain, that the Law of God requires nothing more of any human being, than that which he is at present naturally able to perform, under the present circumstances of his being. Do my brethren deny this? If they do, then they have gone back to Dr. Wilson's ground. If they do not, why am I accounted a heretic by them, for teaching what they themselves maintain?
(11.) In my treatise upon the subject of entire sanctification, I have shown from the Bible, that actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, and that the legal maxim, "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is not good in morals.
(12.) Professor Stuart, in a recent number of the Biblical Repository, takes precisely the same ground that I have taken, and fully maintains, that sin is the voluntary transgression of a known law. And he further abundantly shows, that this is no new or heterodox opinion. Now Prof. Stuart, in the article alluded to, takes exactly the same position in regard to what constitutes sin that I have done in the paragraph upon which so much has been said. And may I be permitted to inquire, why the same sentiment is orthodox at Andover, and sound theology in the Biblical Repository, but highly heterodox and dangerous at Oberlin?
(13.) Will my brethren of the New School, to avoid the conclusiveness of my reasonings in respect to the requirements of the Law of God, go back to Old Schoolism, physical depravity, and accountability based upon natural inability, and all the host of absurdities belonging to its particular views of orthodoxy? I recollect that Dr. Beecher expressed his surprise at the position taken by Dr. Wilson, to which I have alluded, and said he did not believe that "many men could be found, who could march up without winking to the maintenance of such a proposition as that." But to be consistent, I do not see but that my brethren, with or "without winking," are driven to the necessity, either of "marching up" to maintaining the same proposition, or they must admit, that this objectionable paragraph in my lecture is the truth of God.
11. An eleventh attribute of Moral Law is Unity. Moral Law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to God, and to all moral agents. The whole of its requisitions in their spirit and last analysis, are summed up and expressed in one word, love or benevolence. This I only announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. Law is a pure and simple idea of the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal and constant consecration of the whole being, to the highest good of being. Just this is, and nothing more nor less, can be Moral Law; for just this, and nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course of life exactly suited to the nature and relations of moral agents, which is the only true definition of Moral Law.
To suppose, that under any possible or conceivable circumstances, the Moral Law should require any thing more or less, were to make a supposition contrary to the very nature of Moral Law. It were to overlook the proper definition of Moral Law, as has been said before.
12. Equity is another attribute of Moral Law. Equity is equality. That only is equitable which is equal. The interest and well-being of every sentient existence and especially of every moral agent, is of some value in comparison with the interests of others and of the whole universe of creatures. Moral Law, by a necessity of its own nature, demands that the interest and well-being of every member of the universal family shall be regarded according to its relative or comparative value, and that in no case shall it be sacrificed or wholly neglected without his forfeiture to whom it belongs. The distinction allowed by human tribunals between law and equity does not pertain to Moral Law, nor does or can it strictly pertain to any law. For it is impossible that that should be law, in the sense of imposing obligation to obey, of which equity is not an attribute. An inequitable law can not be. The requirements of law must be equal. A moral agent may, by transgression, forfeit the protection of law and may come into such governmental relations by trampling on the Law, that Moral Law may demand that he be made a public example--that his interest and well-being be laid upon the altar, and that he be offered a sacrifice to public justice as a preventive of crime in others. It may happen also that sacrifices may be demanded by Moral Law of innocent beings for the promotion of a greater amount of good than that sacrificed by the innocent. Such was the case with the atonement of Christ, and such is the case with the missionary and with all who are called by the Law of Love to practice self-denial for the good of others. But let it be remembered that Moral Law never requires or allows any degree of self-denial and self-sacrifice that relinquishes a good of greater value than that gained by the sacrifice. Nor does it in any case demand or permit that any interest not forfeited by its possessor, shall be relinquished or finally neglected without adequate ultimate compensation. As has been said, every interest is of some comparative value; and ought to be esteemed just in proportion to its comparative value. Moral Law demands and must demand that it shall be so regarded by all moral agents to whom it is known. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is its unalterable language. It can absolutely utter no other language than this, and nothing can be Moral Law or Law in any sense that ought to be obeyed, or that can innocently be obeyed which holds any other language. Law is not and can not be an arbitrary enactment of any being or number of beings. Unequal Law is a misnomer. That is, that which is unequal in its demands is not and can not be Law. Law must respect the interests and the rights of all and of each member of the universal family. It is impossible that it should be otherwise, and still be Law.
13. Expediency is another attribute of Moral Law.
That which is upon whole wise, is expedient,--that which is upon the whole expedient is demanded by Moral Law. True expediency and the spirit of Moral Law are always identical. Expediency may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of Moral Law. Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of that course which is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as in the case of the commandments of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept of the Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or commandment is never to be set aside by any considerations of expediency. We may know with certainty that what is required is expedient. The command is the expressed judgment of God in the case and reveals with unerring certainty the true path of expediency. When Paul says, "All things are lawful unto me but all things are not expedient," we must not understand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were lawful to him, or that anything was in this sense lawful to him that was not expedient. But he doubtless intended that many things were inexpedient that are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,--that the spirit of the law prohibited many things not expressly forbidden by the letter. It should never be forgotten that that which is plainly demanded by the highest good of the universe is Law. It is expedient. It is wise. The true spirit of the Moral Law does and must demand it. So, on the other hand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest good of the universe is illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must be prohibited by the spirit of Moral Law. But let the thought be repeated, that the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly expedient, and in no case are we at liberty to set aside the spirit of any commandment upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Some have denounced the doctrine of expediency altogether as at all times inconsistent with the Law of Right. These philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the Law of Right and the Law of Benevolence are not identical but inconsistent with each other. This is a common but fundamental mistake, which leads me to remark that,
14. Exclusiveness is another attribute of Moral Law. That is, Moral Law is the only possible rule of Moral Obligation. A distinction is usually made between Moral, Ceremonial, Civil, and Positive Laws. This distinction is in some respects convenient, but is liable to mislead and to create an impression that a law can be obligatory, or in other words that that can be Law that has not the attributes of Moral Law. Nothing can be Law in any proper sense of the term that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon moral agents under the same circumstances. It is Law because and only because that under all the circumstances of the case the course prescribed is fit, proper, suitable to their natures, relations and circumstances. There can be no Law as a rule of action for moral agents but Moral Law, or the Law of Benevolence. Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very nature of Moral Law. Surely there can be no Law that is or can be obligatory upon moral agents but one suited to and founded in their nature, relations and circumstances. This is and must be the Law of Love or Benevolence. This is the Law of Right and nothing else is or can be. Everything else that claims to be Law and to impose obligation upon moral agents, from whatever source it emanates, is not and can not be a Law, but must be an imposition and "a thing of nought."
15. Utility is also an attribute of Moral Law. Law proposes the highest good of universal being as its end and requires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end. Consequently Utility must be one of its attributes. That which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be demanded by Moral Law. Moral Law must, from its own nature, require just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the highest degree promotive of the public good,--in other words, that which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful. It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be obligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect misery. Than which a more nonsensical affirmation was never made. The affirmation assumes that the Law of Right and of Good-Will are not only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be Law that is not suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. Certainly it will not be pretended that that course of willing and acting that necessarily tends to and results in universal misery can be consistent with the nature and relations or moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their nature and relations that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest well-being. Utility and Right are always and necessarily at one. They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon the whole most useful is right, and that which is right is upon the whole useful.
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